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‘The tree which moves some to tears of joy is in the eyes of others
only a green thing that stands in the way’
(William Blake 1799 in ESRU 1998)3
Fractured environments: diversity and conflict in perceptions of
environmental risk
Kevin Burchell
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Abstract
This paper reinforces existing notions that conflicts surrounding environmental risk are the
result of seemingly contradictory theoretical approaches (realist and constructionist) and of
diverse perceptions of environmental risk, which tend to reflect issues of power and status.  It
is suggested that an integrated theoretical approach may offer opportunities for the resolution
and avoidance of conflict surrounding environmental risk.  Proposals are made for the further
development of cultural theory as a typology of orienting mechanisms that explain
individuals’ perceptions of environmental risk.  The efficacy of the psychometric paradigm as
an appropriate tool for the exploration of environmental risk perception is questioned and a
future research agenda is proposed.4
1. Introduction
1.1. The risk paradox and late-modernity
This paper is concerned with environmental risk.  In particular, it is concerned with how and
why different people construct the same risks in different ways and the implications that this
has for society as a whole.  The notion of risk appears to be central to concepts of late-
modernity.  Modern confidence in progress, rationality, positivism, and objective truth and
knowledge have all been undermined and eroded.  Post-war socio-economic certainties, such
as family structures, class and gender roles, job security and political ideologies, have
collapsed.  And, perhaps most importantly, the contemporary environmental crisis has rocked
the, apparently solid, industrial, scientific and technological foundations upon which modern
society is based, and perhaps even threatens modern society itself.  What’s left, it seems, is
subjectivity, uncertainty, diversity...and risk.
In his compelling and influential risk society theory, the arch late-modernist, Ulrich
Beck (1994, p. 8), celebrates this ‘return to uncertainty’.  However, at the same time, Beck
himself is objective and certain about the environmental crisis, and he seeks to universalise
environmental risk by describing ‘a society marching under the banner “We are scared”’
(1992).  Unfortunately for Beck, contemporary theoretical and empirical work on
environmental risk construction refuses to bear out this vision.  According to this body of
work, late-modern society is not universally scared; rather, environmental risk is a highly
subjective and uncertain phenomena.  The paradox is that, despite this, Beck is right to be
concerned; ‘people do die’ (Dake, 1992, p. 33) and ‘people are getting hurt or killed’ (Renn,
1992, p. 61) as a result of the environmental risks that they face.
In this paper, I have theoretical, empirical and practical objectives.  Theoretically, I
engage with contemporary debates surrounding environmental risk; in particular, I examine
the political implications of the ontological paradox, illustrated above, that environmental
risk is, somehow at the same time, both objectively real and subjectively constructed.
Empirically, within particular strands of the theoretical framework, I contribute in a small,
but hopefully original, way to the growing body of empirical work that examines how
individuals might construct environmental risk.  Practically, this paper proposes a research
agenda to address some of the issues raised.  However, before embarking upon these
objectives, it is essential to provide a conceptual framework for the theoretical substance and
the empirical methodology of the paper.5
1.2. Conceptual framework and values
The conceptual framework from which this paper is written stems, to some extent, from
aspects of postmodern perspectives derived from the work of structuralists, such as Saussure
and Lévi-Strauss, and poststructuralists, such as Derrida, Lyotard and Foucault.  Although
divergent in many respects, and despite postmoderity’s ‘chequered career at the cutting edge
of social theory’ (Hannigan, 1995, p. 178), this body of work has some common tenets that
are substantively and methodologically important.  See Gare (1995, pp. 36-72), Giddens
(1987, pp. 73-108), Lyotard (1994), Sayer (1992) and Seidman (1994).
The epistemic and ontological focus of this perspective is on the subjective nature of
knowledge and perceptions of how the world is.  This derives from the notion that language
is a contextual system of signs that is distinct from, and has only an arbitrary relationship to,
that which is signified in the real world.  Since knowledge and perception are primarily
represented through language (Sayer, 1992, p. 6), they become equally subjective, contextual
and arbitrary; what Sayer (1992, p. 60) terms ‘context-dependent’, rather than universal.
Thus, the seemingly immutable power structures inevitable within language and
knowledge (Olsson, 1987, p. 249), and modern notions of universal, objective knowledge, are
challenged by such perspectives.  The legitimacy of dominant knowledge and perceptions,
such as those produced by science, experts (including social scientists) and other dominant
groups is questioned, and ‘marginal’ knowledge and perceptions, such as that produced by
unscientific, lay and ‘marginal’ groups is given greater legitimacy.  This leads, inevitably, to
conflict and contestation.  As was suggested earlier, and shall be examined more closely later,
the substantive aspect of this paper, environmental risk, represents a prime example of this
(Hannigan, 1995 and Gandy, 1997).
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Turning to methodological considerations, acknowledgement of the ‘context-
dependent’ nature of knowledge also undermines the notion of the objective researcher.
Since the researcher is inevitably ‘conceptually saturated’ (Sayer, 1992, p. 53), that is
working within specific theoretical and experiential contexts (or what Haraway (1996)
delightfully calls ‘wormholes’), the researcher is limited to interpretations within this context
and cannot be expected to be an objective recorder and interpreter of new facts.  Based upon
these observations, seven points might be made about the nature of knowledge with respect to
social science research, as shown in Box 1.
Such realisations, when taken to extremes, may suggest that knowledge is such an
unreliable phenomena that its production is not worthwhile.  Fortunately, this is not the case,6
as Sayer (1992, p. 5) puts it, ‘knowledge is not immune to empirical check, and its
effectiveness in informing and explaining...is not mere accident’.  Clearly, though, the
production of knowledge needs to be undertaken within a framework that is realistic about its
fallibility.
This might be achieved in a number of ways.  Sayer (1992, p. 65) suggests that a
‘realistic approach’ to social science research might endeavour to establish ‘practically-
adequate’ knowledge; that is contextual, yet intersubjectively intelligible knowledge, rather
than truth.  Rydin (1998) adds that this may be achieved through the interaction of different
knowledges.  A realistic approach might also be reflected in commitments to ‘look at
contrary evidence’, possibly from unscientific, lay or ‘marginal’ sources, to ‘clarification and
classification of the values [my italics] underlying the research’, to ‘accurate reporting of all
processes employed and [explicit] separation of simple reporting and interpretation (Eichler,
1988, pp. 13-4 in Robson, 1993, pp. 65-6), and to fully embed the research in theory (Gilbert,
1993, p. 18).  It is hoped that the reader will pick up the ways in which these aspirations have
been put into practice in this paper.
1. The world exists independently of knowledge of it.
2. Knowledge of the world is contextual, subjective, fallible and theory-laden.
3. Knowledge cannot be gained purely through observation of the world.
4. Knowledge cannot be adequately reflected in language.
5. Scientific, expert and dominant group knowledge cannot be assumed to be the
highest, most objective form of knowledge.
6. Knowledge cannot be considered within a stable, universal framework.
7. Knowledge and the production of knowledge are social constructs and are,
therefore, characterised by relations of power.
Box 1. The  implications  for  knowledge  of  aspects  of  postmodern
perspectives (adapted from Sayer, 1992, pp. 5-6 and 13).7
With respect to the personal values underlying this research, several points can be made.  I do
perceive considerable environmental risk; not of global proportions perhaps, in the style of
global warming or ozone depletion, but certainly in the sense of steadily deteriorating local
environmental conditions, manifested as air pollution, water pollution, concerns over food
production, the commodification of land/nature and so on.  For me, such issues cannot be
separated from the more damaging dynamics of the modern, capitalist, industrial society in
which we live.  In my more contemplative moments, I also associate this with a loss of
spirituality in society which I would link, to some extent, with a damaging, modern
distancing of society from nature.
As far as I can tell, society’s response to environmental problems appears to be an
unsatisfactory technocratic and modern one.  It is perhaps for this reason that I am attracted to
some of the theoretical and practical insights that a postmodern perspective can provide, such
as the constructionist approach to environmental risk that features strongly in this paper and
the comments about the inadequacy of knowledge discussed earlier.
1.3. The technical approach to environmental risk
Environmental risks can be characterised as threats to society that accrue from the interaction
of technology and nature.  In a western urban context, this covers a multitude of sins,
including air and water pollution, food safety, noise, technological accidents, waste facilities,
global warming, acid rain and ozone depletion.
As Benton and Redclift (1994), and Lash, Szerszynski and Wynne (1996) suggest, the
dominant response to contemporary environmental risk has been a technical, functional and
positivistic endeavour to establish ‘the status of current threats’ (Lash et al., 1996, p. 1).
‘Risk professionals’ (Dietz and Rycroft 1987 in Hannigan, 1995, p. 92) - scientists,
epidemiologists, engineers, actuaries, economists and others - are charged with producing
qualitative, neutral and objective risk assessments; defined as, ‘a combination of the
probability, or frequency, of occurrence of a defined hazard and the magnitude of the
consequences of the occurrence’ (Royal Society, 1992, p. 4).  Such assessments are used for
risk management - to support health and safety policy decisions, and to minimise
environmental degradation, and for risk communication - to convince a sceptical public of the
safety of various technologies (see Renn, 1992, pp. 58-64 and Royal Society, 1992).
This ‘technocentric’ (O’Riordan, 1981) approach to environmental risk reflects distinct
ontological and epistemological perspectives.  Ontologically, this approach assumes that8
nature exists ‘out there’ (Irwin, 1997, p. 219), distinct and disembedded from society and
culture, and that environmental risk is the real, quantifiable product of society’s impact on
nature.  This dualistic view leads to the ‘realist’ epistemic assumption that human knowledge
of nature and, therefore, environmental risk can also be singular, neutral and objective.  The
affect of this approach has been to ‘evacuate them [environmental challenges] of any social
or cultural meanings’ and to construe them instead in terms of technological management
with no quarter given to cultural heterogeneity (Lash et al., 1996, p. 4).  It is not surprising,
therefore, that risk professionals express frustration at the consistent failure of the general
public to be convinced by their risk management and risk communication efforts.  Slovic
(1993, p. 677) quotes BL Cohen Before it’s too late: a scientist’s case for nuclear energy
(1983) as typical of this frustration:
‘the major reason for public misunderstanding of nuclear power is a grossly
unjustified fear from the hazards from radioactive waste...there is general
agreement among those scientists involved with waste management that radioactive
waste disposal is a rather trivial technical problem.’
According to Paul Slovic and his colleagues, such conflict emerges because experts and
the public have ‘vastly different conceptual framework[s] in which their opinions are formed’
(Flynn, Slovic and Mertz, 1993, p. 643) (one is reminded here of Haraway’s aforementioned
‘wormholes’).  As a result of this, risk professionals conduct their risk management and risk
communication activities in manners which can appear untrustworthy to the public.  In
combination with the fact that trust is difficult to build and easy to destroy (Slovic, 1993a;
1997), the issue of trust becomes of vital importance with respect to perceptions of
environmental risk.
1.4. Beyond the technical: the constructionist approach
The key challenge to the technical perspective springs from the constructionist approach.
This perspective suggests a rather less stable epistemology and ontology.  In contrast to the
traditional view, nature is ‘in here’ (Irwin, 1997, p. 219); part of, interrelated to and
interdependent on society.  The implication of this is that social understanding, knowledge
and perception of both nature and environmental risk cannot be neutral and objective.  Rather
it will be subjective; shaped and constructed by cultural, social, economic, political and
psychological factors.9
In his excellent book, Environmental sociology: a social constructionist perspective, John
Hannigan (1995) analyses the way in which society constructs environmental risks.  The
constructionist approach to the environment takes its inspiration from constructionist
challenges to the functionalist view of social problems, such as crime, divorce and mental
illness (see, for example, Spector and Kitsuse, 1973 in Hannigan, 1995).  Whereas the
functionalist view sees these issues as ‘readily identifiable, distinctive and visible objective
conditions [ripe for the application of] scientific methods to locate and analyse these moral
violations and advise policy-makers on how best to cope’ (p32), the constructionist approach
concentrates upon the processes by which issues are ‘assembled, presented and contested’
(p187) as problems.  In the context of the environment, Hannigan (1995, p. 30) puts it thus:
‘social constructionism does not uncritically accept the existence of an environmental crisis
brought on by unchecked population growth, over-production, dangerous technologies, etc.
Instead, it focuses on the social, political and cultural processes by which environmental
conditions are defined as being unacceptably risky and therefore actionable.’
Hannigan argues that six conditions are required for the successful construction of an
environmental risk by society; these are shown in Box 2.  It is not my intention here to debate
the merits of Hannigan’s list, although it is certainly worth considering the extent to which
the existence of political incentives for taking positive action is required for successful
environmental risk construction.  Hannigan’s list is interesting, however, in the context of the
earlier conceptual debate concerning the legitimacy of rival knowledge, since it suggests that
knowledge presented by 'popularisers' and the media is as important as that presented by
science.  This notion is more fully developed by Wynne (1992; 1996) who calls for a general
levelling of the hierarchy of expert over lay rationality, legitimacy and knowledge in attempts
to deal with environmental issues.  Wynne cites two UK examples, debates over the herbicide
2,4,5-T and the protection of Cumbrian sheep in the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear
accident, in which experts detrimentally ignored and derided the practical lay knowledge of
farm and forest workers, and Cumbrian hill farmers respectively.10
1. Scientific validation of risk claims.
2. Existence of ‘popularisers’, such as Jonathan Porritt.
3. Supportive media attention.
4. Dramatisation of the problem in symbolic or visual terms, for example, the
‘ozone hole’.
5. Economic incentives for taking positive action.
6. Existence of institutional sponsors, such as the United Nations or NGOs.
Box 2. The necessary factors for the successful construction of an
environmental risk (adapted from Hannigan, 1995, pp. 54-6).
Dake (1992, p. 24) suggests that environmental risk is ‘politically negotiated’, Slovic
(1997, p. 308) that ‘defining [environmental risk] is an exercise in power’.  By analysing the
arenas, actors, and socio-political power relations of risk construction, using large scale
examples (such as acid rain and bovine growth hormone) and small scale examples (such as
public meetings on local environmental issues such as waste facilities or river pollution),
Hannigan’s constructionist approach to environmental risk shows the extent to which this is
the case.  Nowhere are these power-relations more graphically exposed than in the reports
from stage-managed public meetings relating to local environmental issues in Box 3.
However, the constructionist approach, with its emphasis on social processes, can be
charged with cultural relativism (Benton, 1994) and political naivety because it seemingly
denies the reality of environmental risk (Kaprow, 1985 in Dake, 1992).  In countering this,
constructionists appear to acknowledge that risk is real.  Hannigan (1995, p. 30) states that,
‘environmental risks and problems as socially constructed entities need not undercut
legitimate claims about the condition of the environment, thereby denying them an objective
reality’ and reminds us that ‘both valid and invalid social problem claims have to be
constructed’; and, as has been mentioned, Dake (1992, p. 33) is startlingly realist as he
reminds us that ‘people do die’.
The two main strands of work that run counter to the technical notion of risk are the
highly constructionist cultural theory of anthropologist, Mary Douglas and political scientist,
Aaron Wildavsky, and psychologist, Paul Slovic’s, psychometric paradigm.11
Public information meetings or hearings are routinely stage-managed by risk generators and arbiters.
At public meetings concerning the building of a sewage detention tank on Lake Ontario [which
Hannigan attended as a local resident], members of the public works department, local politicians
(who strongly supported the project) and representatives of the private engineering firm who had
recommended the building of the tanks all sat together on the elevated stage of the auditorium whose
perimeters were adorned with charts, blown-up photographs and other ‘props’.  We citizens were
restricted to a single question with no follow-up.  Those who queried the suitability of the project
were alternately bullied or patronised.  On contentious issues the presenters did not hesitate to
introduce a ream of previously unseen statistical evidence which we had no way of confirming or
denying without days or weeks of further research.
Kaminstein (1988) argues that embodied in the public presentation of scientific information at
meetings concerning the health and safety aspects of toxic waste dumps is a rhetoric of containment
which restricts discussion, avoids tough questions and pursues its own agenda.  Drawing on three
years of observations at EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) meetings held to inform residents of
Pitman, new Jersey, about the steps which were being taken to clean up the Lipari landfill, the site of
one of the worst dumps in the United States, Kaminstein concludes that residents were not so much
informed or persuaded as controlled and defeated.  The primary tool which scientific experts
associated with the EPA and the Centers for Disease Control used to stifle citizen initiatives was toxic
talk - talk which stifles discussion and smothers public concern.  The rhetoric of containment has
multiple elements.
First, residents were bombarded with technical information.  At one meeting, EPA officials gave out
documents totalling forty-four pages.  Those in attendance were expected to assimilate an array of
data, charts, graphs, tables and a slide show in rapid succession.  At the same time, the facts that
residents wanted were never available and no explanation or interpretation was given as to the
information which the consultant scientists presented.
At the front of the room was a large dais raised about two feet, a long table and nine large, high-
backed chairs on which the scientists sat, creating a physical and psychological distance from the
audience.  Various dramatic props, for example, an enlarged photograph of an air monitoring vehicle
which looked like a recreational camper, were employed as rhetorical devices to pacify the residents
and enhance the power of those in charge of the meeting.
The factual presentation style used by EPA officials and scientists was abstract, impersonal and
technical, thus creating an impression of professional neutrality.  It was the activist residents who
became angry and confontative, allowing officials to dismiss them as ‘emotional’.  Questions which
dealt with the geology and hydrology of the area, future tests and plans for the clean-up were
addressed but those which dealt with health risks were avoided or deflected.  Officials and scientists
used language in their presentations which was technical, ambiguous and intellectual, making it
impossible for any meaningful dialogue to develop between the experts and residents over the nature
and magnitude of the risks faced by the residents of Pitman.
Box 3. Reports from public meetings on local environmental issues in North America
(Hannigan, 1995, pp. 104-6).12
1.4.1. Cultural theory
In Risk and culture: an essay on the selection of technological and environmental dangers,
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 8) attempt to understand ‘how particular kinds of danger
come to be selected for attention’.  Cultural theory was further developed in Schwarz and
Thompson’s Divided we stand (1990) and Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky’s Cultural theory
(1990), by integrating the work of Douglas and Wildavsky with Holling’s ‘myths of nature’
(1979, 1986 in Adam, 1995).  See also the reviews in Dake and Wildavsky (1990), Dake
(1992), Raynor (1992), Renn (1992), Royal Society (1992), Adam (1994), Hannigan (1995),
Peters and Slovic (1996), and Ellis and Thompson (1997).
Cultural theory is perhaps the most constructionist and structural perspective on risk
(Renn, 1992).  Although not explicit, the links with the conceptual framework described
earlier are clear; as Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 186) suggest, within this perspective,
‘perceptions of risk...are collective constructs, a bit like language [my italics]’.  Cultural
theory proposes that distinct patterns are discernible in cultural constructions of risk and that
these are closely related to cultural worldviews and ‘myths of nature’.
As Figure 1 shows, cultural theory relies upon a bi-axial typology.  The horizontal
axis represents a continuum from individualized to collectivized beliefs, and the vertical a
continuum from belief in prescribed behaviour and inequality to belief in non-prescribed
behaviour and equality.  Each of the four sections of the typology contains a worldview
developed from Douglas and Wildavsky: individualist, egalitarian, hierarchist and fatalist,
and a corresponding ‘myth of nature’ developed from Holling: nature benign, nature
ephemeral, nature perverse/tolerant and nature capricious respectively.  In each ‘myth of
nature’ the status of nature is represented graphically by a ball and line.  Extensive
investigation of these worldviews and ‘myths of nature’ is presented in Divided we stand and
Cultural theory; Table 1 presents a summary of these in two parts.13
THE FATALIST THE HIERARCHIST
THE INDIVIDUALIST THE EGALATARIAN
Nature capricious Nature perverse/tolerant
Nature benign Nature ephemeral
Collectivized Individualized
Non-prescribed behaviour/
Equality
Prescribed behaviour/
Inequality
Figure 1. The cultural theory typology (based on Adams 1995, Figure 3.1 p34
and Figure 3.3 p36).14
Table 1. Part 1.
The cultural theory typology (Individualists and Egalitarians)
(based on Adams, 1995, pp. 34-6).
Individualists Egalitarians
Worldview Enterprising “self-made”
people, relatively free from
control by others, and strive to
control their environment and
the people in it.  Their success
is often measured by wealth and
the number of followers they
can command.
Have strong group loyalties but
little respect for externally
imposed rules, other than those
imposed by nature.  Group
decisions are arrived at
democratically and leaders rule
by force of personality and
persuasion.
Typical
member
The self-made Victorian mill
owner would make a good
representative of this category.
Members of religious sects,
communards, and
environmental pressure groups
all belong to this category.
Myth
of nature
Nature benign: nature,
according to this myth, is
predictable, bountiful, robust,
stable, and forgiving of any
insults humankind might inflict
upon it; however violently it
might be shaken, the ball comes
safely to rest in the bottom of
the basin.  Nature is the benign
context of human activity, not
something that need to be
managed.
Nature ephemeral: here nature
is fragile, precarious and
unforgiving.  It is in danger of
being provoked by human
carelessness into catastrophic
collapse.  The objective of
environmental management is
the protection of nature from
humans.  People, the myth
insists, must tread lightly on the
Earth.
Management
style
The management style
associated with this myth is
therefore relaxed, non-
interventionist, laissez-faire.
The guiding management rule is
the precautionary principle.15
Table 1. Part 2.
The cultural theory typology (Hierarchists and Fatalists)
(based on Adams, 1995, pp. 34-6).
Hierarchists Fatalists
Worldview Inhabit a world with strong
group boundaries and
prescribing restrictions.  Social
relationships in this world are
hierarchical, with everyone
knowing his or her place.
Have minimal control over their
lives.  They belong to no groups
responsible for the decisions
that rule their lives.  They are
resigned to their fate and they
see no point in attempting to
change it.
Typical
member
Members of caste-bound Hindu
society, soldiers of all ranks,
and civil servants, are
exemplars of this category.
Non-unionized employees,
outcasts, and the socially-
excluded are representative of
this category.
Myth
of nature
Nature perverse/tolerant: this is
a combination of modified
versions of the first two myths.
Within limits, nature can be
relied upon to behave
predictably.  It is forgiving of
modest shocks to the system,
but care must be taken not to
knock the ball over the rim.
Regulation is required to
prevent major excesses, while
leaving the system to look after
itself in minor matters.
Nature capricious: nature is
unpredictable.  The appropriate
management style is again
laissez-faire, in the sense that
there is no point to
management.  Whereas
adherents to the myth of nature
benign trust nature to be kind
and generous, the believer in
nature capricious is agnostic;
the future may well turn out
well or badly, but  it is beyond
his or her control.
Management
style
The manager’s style is
interventionist.
The non-manager’s motto is que
sera sera.16
Cultural theory contends that what societies choose to call risky is determined by social and
cultural factors, not by nature.  Further, it suggests that debates over environmental risk, such
as that between risk professionals and the general public, in which each side charges the other
with stupidity and irrationality, can on inspection be attributed to opposing worldviews and
‘myths of nature’ rooted in culture.  As the Reverend Sydney Smith (in Adams, 1995, p. 50)
remarked of two women arguing with each other from their doorsteps, ‘They’ll never agree
with each other; they’re arguing from different premises.’
As a constructionist approach, cultural theory has been subject to the criticisms
mentioned earlier; in addition, it has been criticised for cultural determinism and
stereotyping.  Raynor (1992, p. 106-7) counters that cultural theory does not imply ‘that
culture locks individuals into a particular worldview’, rather it assumes that ‘cultural bias is
unavoidable’.  However, Raynor acknowledges a certain degree of stereotyping but argues
that the categories of bias are, in reality, limited.  Dake (1992 p33) answers charges of
stereotyping by stressing the positive aspects of the typology: ‘that the worldviews provide
powerful cultural lenses, magnifying one danger, obscuring another threat’.  Adams (1995, p.
64) is critical of the tautologies of cultural theory: ‘Ultimately, it is not clear whether people
are fatalists because they feel they have no control over their lives, or they feel they have no
control because they are fatalists’.  This is a frustration I shared when I came to consider the
results of the present research.
1.4.2. The psychometric paradigm
The psychometric paradigm of risk is primarily associated with the work over the past twenty
years of Paul Slovic and his colleagues at Decision Research and the University of Oregon.
Helpful reviews of this work are provided by Renn (1992), Royal Society (1992), and Slovic
(1992; 1993b).
Although the psychometric paradigm concurs with cultural theory’s assumption that
‘there is no such thing as “real” risk or “objective” risk’ (Slovic, 1992, p. 119), it places far
greater emphasis on individual agency in risk construction.  As its name suggests, the
methodology of this approach relies heavily upon psychometric questionnaire scales.  Early
empirical work theorises that risk perception is largely based upon cognitive responses to
characteristics of the risk itself.
3  Kasperson (1992), and Renn, Burns, Kasperson, Kasperson,
and Slovic (1992) develop this idea, within the concept of the social amplification of risk,
noting that risk perception, as well as being associated with risk characteristics, is also related17
to cultural conditions and media coverage.  However, although all of this work acknowledges
that risk cannot be objective, it also assumes that, based upon a given risk characteristics,
cultural context and level of media coverage, risk perception will be a more-or-less
homogeneous phenomena.
1.4.3. Individual characteristics and the construction of environmental risk
More recent psychometric research posits a very different theory; namely, that risk
construction is largely based upon demographic attributes, individualized cultural theory
worldviews, and other attitudinal factors.  In his PhD thesis Karl Dake (1990 in Dake, 1992)
developed psychometric tools to measure individuals in relation to the four worldviews of
cultural theory.  Within this context, an individual’s worldview is best seen as a ‘lens’ (Dake,
1992, p. 33) or a ‘filter’ (Peters and Slovic, 1996, p. 1446) through which she or he judges,
responds to and interacts with the world.  Since then a body of empirical work that examines
environmental risk construction, worldviews, demographic characteristics and other
attitudinal factors, largely using the psychometric approach has been built in North America.
The findings of this work are summarised in Table 2.
As Table 2 shows, with respect to worldviews, this body of work consistently shows
that greater environmental risks are perceived by egalitarians than by hierarchists, fatalists
and individualists.  This is perhaps unsurprising given the egalitarian ‘myth of nature’ as
‘fragile, precarious and unforgiving’ (Adams, 1995, p. 34).  However, as Wildavsky and
Dake (1990, p. 51) point out, this does not mean that the other groups do not perceive other
risks, for example in their study, ‘social deviance is deemed most dangerous to hierarchists,
and the threat of war...is most feared by individualists’.  Turning to demographic
characteristics, as Table 2 shows, this body of research suggests that women and
disadvantaged ‘racial’ groups have perceptions of greater risk, than white men.  There appear
to be two key reasons for this: actual environmental conditions, and dynamics of power,
status and trust.19
Table 2.
Summary of recent psychometric work on the perception of environmental risk.
Variable Group with perception of greater environmental
risk
Studies
Worldviews People with egalitarian worldview. Dake and Wildavsky (1990), Dake (1992), Palmer (1996), Peters
and Slovic (1996), and Ellis and Thompson (1997).
Demographics
Gender Women. Baldassare and Katz (1992), Stern et al. (1993), Flynn et al. (1994),
McGregor et al. (1994), Bassett et al. (1996), and Davidson and
Freudenburg (1996).
‘Race’ Disadvantaged ‘racial’ groups.
Aboriginals.
Savage (1993) and Flynn, Slovic and Mertz (1994).
Hine et al. (1997).
Neighbourhood People living in environmentally-stressed
neighbourhoods.
Greenberg and Schneider (1995).
Political
orientation
People with liberal political orientations. Baldassare and Katz (1992), and Ellis and Thompson (1997).
Attitudes
Trust in
gov/exp/sci
People with less trust of experts, science and
government.
Flynn, Slovic and Mertz (1994), Davidson and Freudenburg (1996),
Greenberg and Schneider (1997), and Hine et al. (1997).
Techno.
Enthusiasm
People with less enthusiasm for science and
technology.
Peters and Slovic (1996) and Hine et al. (1997).
Concerns about
reg. System.
People who are more concerned about the
regulatory system surrounding environmental risk.
Peters and Slovic (1996).20
Adeola (1994) and Zimmerman (1993) present empirical evidence that disadvantaged
‘racial’ groups are more likely to live in areas containing hazardous waste and
petrochemical facilities.
4  Clearly, this would seem to go a long way to explaining the
greater perception of environmental risk found among disadvantaged ‘racial’ groups
in Flynn, Slovic and Mertz’s (1994) US-wide survey.  However, Greenberg and
Schneider’s (1995) work suggests that, in good environmental conditions, women and
disadvantaged ‘racial’ groups still have greater perceptions of environmental risk than
do men.  As Davidson and Freudenburg (1996, p. 332) put it in their review of 75 US
studies of the gender aspects of environmental risk, ‘There is a need to go beyond
asking only why women worry so much; clearly, the time has come to ask why at
least some White men do not’.
For Flynn, Slovic and Mertz (1994, p. 1101), the answer to this question
appears to be bound up in dynamics of ‘socio-political factors such as power, status,
alienation and trust.’  As Slovic (1993a and 1997) notes, perception of greater risk has
been shown to correlate with lower levels of trust in experts, government and science,
with greater concerns for the regulatory system surrounding environmental risk and
with a lack of technological enthusiasm.  In turn, these attitudinal concepts also
appear to be associated with gender, race and worldviews as described above.
Davidson and Freudenburg’s (1996) review shows that ‘women tend to be more
distrustful than men of institutions, particularly those involving science, technology
and government’ (p. 319).
5  This body of work suggests that greater perceptions of
risk and lower levels of trust are directly related to the lesser power and lower status
that women and disadvantaged ‘racial’ groups have in US society.  Or, as Flynn,
Slovic and Mertz (1994, p. 1107) put it, ‘Perhaps white males see less risk in the
world because they create manage, control and benefit from so much of it.  Perhaps
women and non-white men see the world as more dangerous because in many ways
they are more vulnerable, because they benefit less from many of its technologies and
institutions, and because they have less power and control.’
1.5. Fractured environments
To summarise, by reviewing empirical work, this chapter has reinforced the
theoretical paradox that environmental risk can be considered, somehow at the same
time, to be both real and constructed.  This suggests that we must be wary of referring21
to ‘the environment’; rather, we should perhaps refer to ‘environments’ that are
multiple and diverse.  This chapter has also shown that such multiple environments
inevitably lead to conflict and contestation.  It is for this reason that I refer to
‘fractured environments’; that is, environments that are both multiple and riven with
conflict.
The following section describes how the theoretical and empirical issues
raised in this chapter were formulated into research objectives and questions in the
present research.
2. The present research
2.1. Research objectives and question
As has been suggested, this research had short- and long-term objectives.  In the
short-term, the objective of the research was to contribute to and extend the growing
body of empirical psychometric work that examines the relationships between
perception of environmental risk, worldviews, demographic/socio-economic
characteristics, and other attitudinal factors.
In particular, the research aimed to replicate certain aspects of the studies by
Flynn, Slovic and Mertz (1994) and Peters and Slovic (1996).  These studies used the
same dataset, collected from 1,512 individuals across the US between November
1992 and February 1993, on demographic characteristics, worldviews, attitudes in
various other areas, and perceptions of a variety of health risks.  The present research
did this in a new geographical context; the Thamesfield, West Putney and East Putney
wards in the Putney area of the London Borough of Wandsworth in south west
London.
It is expected that this work will be of interest to geographers, social
psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists.  It is also hoped that the research will
be of interest to risk professionals who are concerned about why and how public
perceptions of risk can be so different from their own.
The longer term objective of this work was to familiarise myself with the
theoretical, conceptual and methodological underpinnings of this approach to risk
perception in order to identify areas for further research.  In particular, questions are22
asked as to the efficacy of the psychometric approach in understanding the complex
mix of social, political, economic, psychological and conceptual orientations that
contribute towards individuals’ construction of environmental risk.
With these research objectives in mind, the following research question was
considered suitable for the design of a survey and the formulation of hypotheses:
What relationships exist between perceptions of environmental risk
and demographic/socio-economic characteristics, worldviews, trust
in experts/government/science, concerns about equity and fairness in
the regulatory system, and technological enthusiasm?
2.2. Methodology
A self-completion questionnaire was constructed based upon the research tool devised
by Flynn, Mertz and Slovic (1994).  The questionnaire contained four main sections,
as follows:
Two sections addressing perception of risk and personal autonomy with
respect to environmental risk each used a five point Likert scale to measure the degree
of risk that respondents perceived from the same twenty hazards (seventeen
environmental/technological plus Crime, Economic uncertainty and Terrorism).  These
hazards were selected based upon sourced questionnaires and local conditions.
A further section contained Likert scales designed to measure the key concepts
identified in the introduction: the worldviews (fatalist, hierarchist, egalitarian and
individualist; based upon the statements developed by Karl Dake (1992)), trust of
experts/science/government, concerns about the regulatory system surrounding
environmental risks, and technological enthusiasm.  These statements were adapted to
the UK context from those devised by Flynn, Mertz and Slovic (1994).  The twenty
five statements and the concepts for which they are indicators can be reviewed in Box
4.
6
  Demographic and socio-economic information was also collected.  This section
was based upon the questionnaires used in the surveys reported in Table 2.
Information on age, gender, ethnic group, type of property lived in, tenure, education,
annual income and voting intentions was collected.  In addition, the Bem femininity
scale, developed by Daryl and Sandra Bem (Paul Slovic, 1998, personal
communication), was used.  This scale contains five items that are stereotypically23
considered to be feminine (understanding, gentle, compassionate, sensitive to the
needs of others, and warm) and five that are stereotypically considered to be masculine
(independent, ambitious, competitive, a leader, and a strong personality).  The
objective of the scale is to construct a self-reported, stereotypical measure of
femininity/masculinity that is independent of gender.  It was expected that higher
measures of femininity will correlate with higher perceptions of environmesntal risk.
In May 1998, following a small pilot study and discussions with experts in the
feild, Professor Paul Slovic at The University of Oregon, Michael Greenberg at
Rutgers University in New Jersey and Don Hine at New England University in New
South Wales, questionnaire packages were hand-delivered to a systematically selected
sample of 500.
Worldviews
Fatalist
·  People can offset health risks from pollution by improving their individual
lifestyles, for example by exercising and eating properly. (number 46 in
questionnaire)
·  I feel that I have very little control over risks to my health. (49)
·  It’s no use worrying about public affairs, I can’t do anything about them anyway.
(61)
 
  Hierarchist
·  People in positions of authority tend to abuse their power. (41)
·  We need to pull together and support the choices the government makes. (47)
·  Those in power often withhold information about things that are harmful to us.
(53)
 
  Egalitarian
·  If people were treated equally, society would have fewer problems. (42)
·  What this world needs is a more equal distribution of wealth. (48)
·  We have gone too far in pushing for equal rights. (54)24
 
  Individualist
·  In a fair system people with more ability should earn more. (57)
·  I admire those who attempt to be independent and self-sufficient by growing their
own food. (58)
·  Government has no right to regulate people’s personal risk-taking activities such as
mountain climbing, hang-gliding and so on. (60)
 
 
  Box 4. Statements used in the questionnaire (continued over).25
  Trust in experts/government/science
·  Experts are able to make accurate estimates about environmental and technological
risks. (43)
·  Differences of opinion about environmental risks can be resolved by scientific data
and analysis. (45)
·  If a scientific study produces evidence that a substance is harmful to humans, we
can be sure that we will be told about it. (50)
·  Our government and industry can be trusted with making the proper decisions
regarding managing environmental and technological risks. (52)
·  Decisions about health risks should be left to the experts. (55)
·  Scientists are able to make accurate estimates about environmental and
technological risks. (56)
·  Unless public health officials alert me, I don’t really have to worry about
environmental health problems. (59)
 
  Equity and fairness
·  The public should be able to vote on issues of environmental risk. (62)
·  When the risk is very small, it is OK for society to impose risks on individuals
without their consent. (63)
·  People living near the source of a potential environmental risk, for example and
waste disposal plant, should have the authority to close the plant if they think it is
not being run properly. (64)
·  The process of approving the development of plants that might have an
environmental risk provides adequate opportunity for the public to have their
concerns considered. (65)
 
  Technological enthusiasm
·  A high technology society is important for our health and well-being. (44)
·  Technological development is destroying nature. (51)
 
  Box 4 continued. Statements used in the questionnaire.26
  2.3 Results
 
  As was suggested in the introduction, the distinction between reporting and
interpretation will be emphasised as much as possible in this paper.  With this in
mind, this section should be regarded as a report of the results, while the following
section should be read as interpretation.
  Two objections can be raised regarding the validity of these results.  The first
relates to sampling problems which led to the under representation of purpose-built
and converted flats in the sample compared to the population.  The second relates to
the response rate; a disappointing 81 (16.2%).
  Statistical analysis was undertaken in SPSS 7.5.2. and, following a preliminary
factor analysis, of the twelve statements relating to the worldviews, took the form of
an analysis of the relationships between the various components of the questionnaire.
 
  2.3.1. Preliminary factor analysis
 
  The number of factors retained was largely guided by the theoretical interpretability
of the factors.  This can be said to be the factors upon which statements load with
coefficients greater than .4.  This led to the adoption of a three factor solution, as
shown in Table 3.  This solution was also adopted because it accounts for a
considerable proportion of the variance (45.36%, compared to 37.10% in Peters and
Slovic’s solution) and because it maximises the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of
internal reliability (totalling 1.63, compared to 1.52 in Peters and Slovic’s solution).
While Bryman and Cramer (1997) suggest that Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of .8 or
more might be required to establish internal reliability, as Peters and Slovic (1996)
point out, in this case the coefficients are necessarily low due to the small number of
statements in each factor.  In this case, the relatively small N might also contribute to
the lower alpha coefficients.
  As Table 3 shows, the Egalitarian and Fatalists factors correspond well with
Dake’s (1992) worldviews; although, as can be seen, both have had a further
statement added to them.  The Egalitarian factor, as well as containing the original
three Egalitarian worldview statements, also contains the Individual worldview
statement,  In a fair system, people with more ability should earn more.  It is easy to
see why this statement might represent a negative measure of the Egalitarian who27
dislikes inequality, even when it appears to have some justification.  Likewise, the
Fatalist factor contains the three original Fatalist worldview statements plus one other,
this time from the Hierarchist worldview, People in positions of authority tend to
abuse their power.  Once again, it is not difficult to see how this statement could
represent a positive measure of the Fatalist who feels that things are out of his or her
control.
  The third factor contains both of the remaining statements from the Hierarchist
worldview, We need to pull together and support the choices the government makes
and Those in power often withhold information about things that are harmful to us,
and one of the two remaining statements from the Individualist worldview, I admire
those who attempt to be independent and self-sufficient by growing their own food.
  This new Hierarchist/individualist factor appears to tap, not only into a
hierarchist view of the world, but also a judgement upon whether or not those at the
top of the hierarchy are to be trusted and what the response to this might be.
  The remaining statement from the original Individualist worldview,
Government has no right to regulate people’s personal risk-taking activities, such as
mountain climbing, hang-gliding and so on, did not load onto any of the factors with
sufficient strength.  For this reason, this statement was omitted from the subsequent
analysis of relationships.
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  Table 3.
  Factor analysis results (only loadings above .4 are shown).
 
 
 Statement
 
 Original
world-
 View
 
 Factor 1
Egal.
 
 Factor 2
Fatalist
 
 Factor 3
Hier./
 Ind.
 
      
  If people were treated equally,
society would have fewer
problems.
 
  Egal.
 
  .75
  
  What this world needs is a more
equal distribution of wealth.
 
  Egal.
 
  .73
  
  We have gone too far in pushing
for equal rights.
 
  Egal.
 
  -.69
  
  In a fair system, people with
more ability should earn more.
 
  Ind.
 
  -.59
  
      
  I feel that I have very little
control over risks to my health.
 
  Fatalist
  
  .65
 
  It’s no use worrying about
public affairs; I can’t do any
thing about them anyway.
 
  Fatalist
  
  .63
 
  People can offset health risks
from pollution by improving
their individual lifestyles, for
example by exercising and
eating properly.
 
  Fatalist
  
  -.51
 
  People in positions of authority
tend to abuse their power.
 
  Hier.
  
  .49
 
      
  I admire those who attempt to be
independent and self-sufficient
by growing their own food.
 
  Ind.
   
  .65
  We need to pull together and
support the choices the
government makes.
 
  Hier.
   
  -.62
  Those in power often withhold
information about things that are
harmful to us.
 
  Hier.
  
 
 
 
  -.60
      
  Proportion of variance explained    18.77%   14.37%   12.22%
  Cronbach’s alpha coefficient    .70   .41   .32
      29
   2.3.2. Correlation: demographic attributes
 
  Table 4 shows all of the notable correlation coefficients and their significances
relating to demographic attributes.  In keeping with the norms established in the
studies reviewed in the introduction, correlations above 0.2, with significance greater
than .05, are considered notable.
  With respect to demographics, as Table 4 shows, notable correlations exist in
three key areas relating to demographic attributes.  Findings with respect to gender
and liberal voting intention conform with the literature reviewed in the introduction.
In addition, socio-economic status emerges as a third key factor.
  The present study confirms that women appear to have a greater perception of
environmental risk than men (Spearman’s Rank Correlation coefficient r = .36,
significance  P = .00).  Further, people who scored highly on the femininity scale also
appear to have a greater perception of risk (r = .24, P = .03) and to have a lower
perception of their ability to reduce environmental risk themselves (r = -.29, P = .04).
Confirmation is also provided that people with liberal voting intentions appear to have
a greater perception of risk (r = .24, P = .04).
  Table 4 also contains indications that, in this instance, socio-economic
characteristics might be more important in the determination of perception of
environmental risk than previous studies have suggested.  Results in the present study
suggest that people who live in smaller properties, people with less education and,
particularly, people with lower annual incomes all have greater perceptions of
environmental risk (r = -21, P = .05; r = -.23, P = .03 and r = -.44, P = .00
respectively).  A socio-economic index comprising property size, education and
income shows strongly that people from lower socio-economic groups, thus defined,
have greater perception of risk (r = -.44, P = .00).  It is also worth noting that people
who live in smaller properties appear to perceive less personal ability to reduce
environmental risks to themselves (r = .26, P = .01).
  One final point with respect to demographic characteristics: ethnicity does not
appear to be associated with perception of environmental risk in this context; this may
be a reflection of lesser ethnic segregation in the UK compared to the US.
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  Table 4.
  Notable correlations of Perception of environmental risk and Ability to
reduce environmental risk with demographic attributes.
 
   Perception
  of
environmenta
l risk
  Ability to
reduce
environmenta
l risk
   r   sig.   r   sig.
      
  Age (question 76)     
      
  Gender     
  Gender (question 77)   .36   .00   
  Femininity scale (questions 66 - 75)   .24   .03   -.29   .04
      
  Socio-economic characteristics     
  Size of property (question 78)   -.21   .05   .26   .01
  Tenure (question 80)     
  Education (question 81)   -.23   .03   
  Annual income (question 82)   -.44   .00   
  Socio-economic index   -.44   .00   
      
  Ethnicity (question 78)     
      
  Liberal voting intention (question 83)   .24   .04   
      
 
 
  2.3.2. Correlations: worldviews and other concepts
 
  Turning to the worldviews and other attitudinal concepts, as Table 5 shows, the
present study reinforces the impression created by the US literature, that greater
perception of risk is associated with an egalitarian worldview (r = .21, P = .05).  And,
where Peters and Slovic’s (1997) merged Fatalist/hierarchist worldview has an
association with a lower perception of risk, so too does the merged Hierarchist/
  individualist factor in the present study (r = -.20, P = .06).
  Further concurrence with previous work is shown in the results relating to the
relationship between perceptions of environmental risk and two of the attitudinal
concepts described in the introduction.  As Table 5 shows, three out of the four
‘concerns about the regulatory system’ statements show strong correlations between31
perception of a lack of equity and  fairness  in  the  system  and  greater  perception  of
environmental  risk  (Question (Q) 62: r = .49, Q63: r = -.33 and Q64: r = .49; all with
P = .00).  Similarly, three out of the seven ‘trust in experts/government/science’
statements suggest that a lesser degree of trust is associated with a greater perception
of environmental risk (Q50: r = -.22, P = .04; Q55: r = -.21, P = .05; Q59: r = -.33, P
= .00).  However, the third of the three attitudinal concepts highlighted in the
introduction, ‘technological enthusiasm’, did not show notable correlations with
perception of environmental risk in this study.
  With respect to the selected other risks featured in Section 2 of the
questionnaire, the results shown in Table 5 suggest that people who have greater
perception of environmental risk also have greater perceptions of other risks (Crime: r
= .30, P = .01; Economic uncertainty: r -.31, P = .01; Terrorism: r = .28, P = .01).
Whereas, based upon Dake and Wildavsky’s (1990) comments, one might expect the
Hierarchist/individualist worldview to correlate with greater perceptions of these
risks, the current study does not suggest this.  Indeed, the only notable correlation in
this area suggests an association between a greater perception of economic risk and
the Egalitarian worldview (r = .25, P = .02).
  The original ability to reduce environmental risk section yielded less voluble
results than the earlier section.  As Table 5 shows, perhaps not surprisingly, results
suggest that the Fatalist worldview appears to be associated with a perception of less
personal ability to reduce environmental risks (r = -.21, P = .04).
  With respect to the three attitudinal concepts investigated, there is an
indication that people who perceive a lesser ability to reduce environmental risk also
feel that the regulatory system surrounding environmental risk is an unfair one, are
more enthusiastic about technology, and are less trusting in
experts/government/science.  However, since all of these suggestions are based upon
just one question each (Q65: r = -.31, P = .01; Q44: r = -.31, P = .01; and Q:50 r =
.26, P = .02 respectively), the Ability to reduce environmental risk section is not
discussed in the conclusions.
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  Table 5.
  Notable correlations of Perception of environmental risk and Ability to reduce
environmental risk with worldviews and other attitudinal concepts
 
    Perception
  Of
environmenta
l risk
  Ability to
reduce
environmenta
l risk
   r   sig.   r   sig.
      
  Worldviews     
  Egalitarian   .21   .05   
  Fatalist      -.21   .04
  Hierarchist/individualist   -.20   .06   
      
  Perception of selected other risks     
  Crime   .30   .01   
  Economic uncertainty   .31   .01   
  Terrorism   .28   .01   
      
  Concerns about equity and fairness of the regulatory system  
  62. The public should be able to vote on issues
of environmental risk.
 
  .49
 
  .00
  
  63. When the risk is very small, it is OK for
society to impose risks on individuals without
their consent.
 
  -.33
 
  .00
  
  64. People living near the source of a potential
environmental risk, for example a waste
disposal plant, should have the authority to
close the plant if they think it is not being run
properly.
 
 
 
  .49
 
 
 
  .00
  
  65. The process of approving plants that might
have an environmental risk provides adequate
opportunity for the public to have their
concerns considered.
   
 
  .21
 
 
  .06
  Equity and fairness of the regulatory system
index
  .59   .00   
      
  Technological enthusiasm     
  44. A high technology society is important for
improving our health and well being.
   
  -.31
 
  .01
  51. Technological development is destroying
nature.
    
  Technological enthusiasm index     
      
 
  (continued over the page).33
  Table 5 continued.
  Notable correlations of Perception of environmental risk and Ability to reduce
environmental risk with worldviews and other attitudinal concepts.
 
    Perception
  of
environmenta
l risk
  Ability to
reduce
environmenta
l risk
   r   sig.   r   sig.
      
  Trust in experts/government/science     
  43. Experts are able to make accurate estimates
of environmental risks.
    
  45. Differences of opinion about environmental
risks can be resolved by scientific data and
analysis
    
  50. If a scientific study produces evidence that
a substance is harmful to humans, we can be
sure that we will be told about it.
 
 
  -.22
 
 
  .04
 
 
  .26
 
 
  .02
  52. Our government and industry can be trusted
with making the proper decisions regarding
managing environmental and technological
risks.
    
  55. Decisions about health risks should be left
to the experts.
 
  -.21
 
  .05
  
  56. Scientists are able to make accurate
estimates about environmental and
technological risks.
    
  59. Unless public health officials alert me, I
don’t really have to worry about environmental
health problems.
 
 
  -.33
 
 
  .00
  
  Trust in experts/government/science index 1   -.29   .01   .30   .01
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  3. Discussion
 
  Having reported the results in the previous chapter, this chapter is interpretative in
character.  This paper opened with the contention that after modernity comes
subjectivity, uncertainty, diversity...and risk; that with late-modernity comes
disillusionment with science and technology, and the institutions of modernity.  The
results of this research appear to bear this out (see below); however, it was also
proposed that in late-modern society class and gender might not be the orienting
factors they once were.  This research questions that assertion; both gender and socio-
economic status emerged as significant predictors of perception of environmental risk.
This suggests that late-modernists might be a little over keen to dismiss the
importance of old certainties as contemporary determinants of attitudes and ways of
viewing the world.
 
  3.1. Theoretical conclusions: real constructionism
 
  The results described above appear to support the constructionist view that risk in
general, and environmental risk in particular, are uncertain, varied and subjective
phenomena.  While not very surprising perhaps, it is worth restating that the present
research suggests that some people perceive considerably greater environmental risk
than do others.  At the same time, results suggest that the level of trust that people
have in the institutions that regulate environmental risk, and concern about the
regulatory process itself, are also highly varied.  Diversity of perception of
environmental risk, and these other attitudinal concepts, appears to be constructed
through demographic variations and through cultural orienting dispositions.
  It can be concluded, therefore, that these results reinforce doubts about the risk
professionals’ notion that risk, including environmental risk, is real, singular and
objective.  This provides further emphasise of how unhelpful it is for risk
professionals to dismiss citizens’ concerns as irrational.  At the same time, however,
the research indicates that, for many people, environmental risk is of great concern.
For these people, the idea that such risks are the uncertain and subjective products of
the culture in which they live might appear as untrustworthy as the risk professionals’
certainty.  For such people, as for Ulrich Beck, environmental risk is all too real.35
  The implication of this apparent paradox is that Lash et al. (1996, p. 3) are
right to champion new ways of thinking that can transcend the ‘sterile reductionisms’
of purely constructionist and realist approaches.  This is by no means easy as the two
modes of thought appear to contradict each other and emerge from quite distinct
‘wormholes’; for example, Royal Society (1992) is so unnerved by this that it
conspicuously keeps its treatment of the two approaches entirely separate.
  However, a start has been made: Kasperson (1992, p. 158) defines risk as, ‘in
part an objective threat of harm to people and in part a product of culture and social
experience.’  I would now like to suggest two further foundational tenets for a more
integrated way of thinking.  First, such a new way of thinking need not reflect the two
perspectives equally; second, a certain amount of fluidity in the extent to which each
perspective is reflected, according to the debate at hand, should be permitted.  For
example, Hannigan’s (1995, p. 187) constructionist approach to the environment may
provide the most productive understanding of the power processes by which issues are
‘assembled, presented and contested’ as problems.  As in the present research, one
might utilise a constructionist approach to examine how and why people’s perception
of environmental risk varies.  At the same time, one could adopt the more realist
approach of Ulrich Beck in order to build a compelling position from which to
advocate change to the power processes involved.
  Some may interpret such theoretical fluidity as evading the issue, as a typical
postmodern technique, or just as plain sloppy.  However, it is my contention that,
although theoretically contradictory, the constructionist and realist perspectives on
risk and the environment could offer complementary practical benefits to society.
Perhaps such integrated ways of thinking might offer risk professionals a context
within which to acknowledge and engage with the concerns and knowledge of citizens
in a way that Wynne would applaud.  They may provide politicians the space to
develop more citizen-centred regulatory approaches.  They could offer opportunities
for trust-building dialogue to replace contemporary trust-destroying conflict between
risk professionals, scientists, experts, politicians and so on and the public, such as that
between the EPA teams and citizens groups described by Hannigan.  It could be that
an integration of realist and constructionist approaches to the environment offers the
best opportunity for society to come to grips with contemporary and future
environmental problems.  It is that what, for want of a better term, we might call real36
constructionism, how these strategies might work and the problems that they would
come up against should be the subject of further research.
 
  3.2. Political considerations
 
  With these comments in mind, the research question that was identified earlier in this
paper:
 
  What relationships exist between perceptions of environmental risk
and demographic/socio-economic characteristics, worldviews, affect,
trust in experts/government/science, concerns about equity and
fairness in the regulatory system, and technological enthusiasm?,
 
  can be answered as follows.
  As described in the introduction, Flynn, Slovic and Mertz (1994) and others
suggest that certain societal groups, usually women and disadvantaged ‘racial’ groups,
have a greater perception of environmental risk because they are disadvantaged in
society.  At the same time, people with liberal political orientations appear to share
this greater perception of environmental risk.  In addition, Peters and Slovic (1996)
and others suggest that greater perception of environmental risk is also associated
with an Egalitarian worldview and with certain other attitudinal factors, including
greater concerns about equity and fairness in the regulatory system, technological
enthusiasm and less trust in experts/government/science.
  Notwithstanding statistical objections that could be raised concerning the
extent to which the present results can be considered to be representative, this
research reinforces much of this picture.  Demographically, both female gender and
liberal political orientation emerge as predictors of greater perception of
environmental risk.  Further, this research also suggests a significant role for lower
socio-economic status as a factor in the construction of greater environmental risk.
Greater perception of environmental risk also appears to be associated with the
Egalitarian worldview (and its associated nature ephemeral ‘myth of nature’), less
trust in experts/government/ science and, in particular, greater concerns about equity
and fairness in the regulatory system.
  Of these findings, perhaps the most significant is the emergence of socio-
economic status, particularly income, as a predictor of perception of environmental37
risk.  This finding is important, first of all, because it emerges more strongly here than
in previous studies.  It is also important because it taps right into Flynn, Slovic and
Mertz’s (1994) conclusions about the importance of ‘socio-political factors such as ...
status’ (p1101) and ‘power’ (p1107) in environmental risk perception.  It is clear from
this work that more detailed exploration of the dynamics of autonomy, status, trust,
perceptions, attitudes and worldviews, among these groups would be of considerable
value.
  Of course, as a characterisation of the person who perceives more
environmental risk emerges, so too does a picture of the person who perceives less
environmental risk.  This person is more likely to be male, to have a higher socio-
economic status, and to have a more conservative political orientation.  At the same
time, this person is likely to perceive the world in more Hierarchical/individual terms
(with an associated nature benign/perverse/tolerant ‘myth of nature’ than Egalitarian,
to be satisfied with the regulatory system surrounding environmental risk, and to have
greater trust in experts/government/science.
  As Flynn, Slovic and Mertz (1994) and Davidson and Freudenburg (1996)
before me, I find it easy to conjecture that these conservative, high socio-economic
status men perceive less environmental risk because they have more power to shape
society, are accorded greater status by society, and benefit more from society.  It is
also easy to imagine that they may well themselves be involved somehow in the
development of regulations, whether as experts, senior managers, in government or
Whitehall, or as scientists.  Within these contexts, it is not surprising that these people
are not unduly concerned by the regulatory system surrounding environmental risk
and express greater levels of trust in experts/government/science.
 
  3.3. A further ‘myth of nature’?: nature commodity
 
  The previous sections suggest that issues of power and status appear to be central to
perceptions of environmental risk.  Although such issues are reflected to some extent
in the worldviews of cultural theory, the corresponding ‘myths of nature’ do not
reflect this (see Table 1.1.).  Cultural theory suggests that the Hierarchist/individualist
worldview has a corresponding ‘myth of nature’ as benign and perverse/tolerant.
Although it doesn’t fit perfectly into the cultural theory typology, in the sense that it is
difficult to represent it graphically with a ball and line (see Figure 1), I would like to38
propose an alternative ‘myth of nature’ for this group that does take account of power
and status: nature commodity.  I propose that this ‘myth of nature’ contrasts with
nature benign, in that it acknowledges that nature is not ‘predictable, bountiful,
robust, stable and forgiving’ (Adams, 1995, p. 34).  However, while it concurs with
nature perverse/tolerant that there are ‘limits’ to nature (ibid), nature commodity
differs from nature perverse/tolerant because it is accepting of transgressions of these
limits.  This is the case because the nature commodity ‘myth of nature’ expects that
the environmental risks produced by such transgressions will be distributed among
society according to power and status in much the same way as other commodities
such as houses, cars, education or health care.
  As well as incorporating the vital issues of power and status, the notion of
nature commodity is compelling because it goes some way to explaining NIMBYist
responses to environmental risk.  However, this is just conjecture; clearly, more
detailed research is need into the attitudes, perceptions, worldviews and ‘myths of
nature’ of this powerful group.
  In the meantime, other sections of society seem set to experience increases in
their perceptions of environmental risk, and their disquiet and distrust about
regulatory procedures and the institutions that design them.  As Redclift (1994) and
Benton (1997) point out, the contemporary neo-liberal approach favoured by more
and more governments worldwide encourages both the transferral of regulatory
responsibilities to the private sector and the adoption of highly competitive practices
which mitigate against best practice.  Benton (1997) identifies the BSE crisis as
caused by just such pressures.  Clearly, these trends, and the resulting shifts in public
perception, need to be monitored closely over the coming years.
 
  3.4. Methodological considerations
 
  Some readers may find my sympathy with the epistemological and ontological tenets
of postmodernity, and with the constructionist approach to environmental risk,
somewhat at odds with my use of the psychometric method that was used in the
present research.  I would have to say that I share their unease.  I am concerned that
this approach excessively imposes the researcher’s preconceived ideas on the
respondents.  I fear that the theoretical bases and the practical intentions of the
psychometric approach often veer too much towards the technical notion of risk (this39
is in the sense that it often appears that the objective of the psychometric approach is
to help risk professionals get their risk communication right, rather than to encourage
risk professionals to engage with citizen concerns and to reassess the principles upon
which they carry out their risk assessments and risk management).  Perhaps most
importantly, I feel that the use of researcher-led statements, scales, indices and
statistical tools cannot hope to deal with the complexity of individual’s risk
constructions.  Although I did not interact with my respondents face-to-face, I share
Renn’s (1992, p. 51) views on this:
 
  ‘I found in many of my respondents much wisdom and curiosity, both of
which were largely ignored by my research instruments.  I was bound to
my prestructured, standardized questionnaire and forced to use categories
that my respondents felt inappropriately described their opinions and
values.  Remote from the actual fieldwork, the social scientists of the
polling institute used the numerical data to draw conclusions about
people’s feelings and behaviour.  Often these conclusions appeared
superficial or inadequate, since I had been exposed to the social context in
which the responses were given.’
 
  So too did several of my respondents; the following comments were made in the
space provided in the questionnaire:
 
  ‘Replies to most questions don’t go deep enough into personal opinion,
answers therefore superficial.’
 
  ‘These are answers given quickly.  On reflection, answers might be
different.  Are you interested in first thoughts or reflected opinions?
 
  ‘As always, many answers are actually much more complex and
qualified than a simple tick can illustrate.’
 
  Bearing these misgivings in mind, it seems necessary for me to explain why I utilised
the psychometric approach in this research.  This was done because almost all of the
empirical work in this area has followed this approach.  For this reason, I considered
it essential that I familiarise myself with the approach before moving on to more
ambitious work.  That is, of course, to familiarise myself without being seduced by its
obvious attractions; for over the past twenty years or so, this approach to the study of
perceptions of environmental risk, and risk in general, has produced remarkably
consistent, voluble and cogent results.40
  Notwithstanding this, it is for the reasons described earlier that it is suggested
that the adoption of qualitative research methods will better serve future work that
explores people’s perception of environmental risk.  As Robson (1993) indicates,
qualitative work, most likely in-depth interviews or focus groups, is able to produce
information that is highly detailed, contextual and insightful.  Further, in the context
of qualitative work, respondents will be able to fully elaborate on their motivations
and constructions, rather than relying on the researcher to second guess what these
might be.  Such an approach would be particularly useful, utilising a highly
purposeful sampling method, for investigating the perceptions, attitudes, worldviews
and ‘myths of nature’ of ‘extreme cases’ (Creswell, 1998, p. 119).  These might
include the conservative, high socio-economic status men who perceive little
environmental risk or other groups, possibly liberal, lower socio-economic status
women who may have a much lower sense of autonomy and power in general and
with respect to environmental risk.
  Of course, this is not to suggest that a qualitative approach would not be
without its own problems; quantitative work is, for example, doubtless more capable
of capturing large scale trends and can lay greater claim to being representative of a
general phenomenon.  It is for this reason that it is suggested that the methodology for
future research into perceptions of environmental risk should utilise ‘hybrid or
combined strategies’ (Robson, 1993, p. 41) or ‘triangulation techniques’ (Creswell,
1994, p. 7), taking advantage of both qualitative and quantitative research methods.
 
  3.5. A research agenda
 
  The issues discussed in the previous two sections provide a fascinating agenda for
further research:
 
·  Theoretical development of an integrated real constructionist approach to nature
and to environmental risk.
·  Investigation of how such an approach might lead to innovative, inclusive
responses to conflicts surrounding environmental risk.
·  Monitoring of the contribution of environmental issues to wider debates
surrounding the future of modernity.41
·  Complementary empirical work examining:
·  dynamics of power, autonomy and status, trust, worldviews and ‘myths of
nature’ (particularly nature commodity) among groups with both low and
high perceptions of environmental risk.
·  diachronic study of changes over time in perceptions of environmental risk.
·  Development of contextualised, information-rich, qualitative approaches to the
study of perception of environmental risk.42
Notes
1. The author can be contacted by e-mail at: k.burchell@lse.ac.uk or at
kevin@impactfactory.demon.co.uk, or by telephone or fax on: +44 (0)181 488
6521 (please call before sending a fax).
2. Further examples of contested knowledge and perceptions produced by so-
called ‘marginal’ groups are provided by feminists, such as Haraway (1994)
and Scott (1994); Clifford (1994) writes from a non-white perspective, and
Edelman (1994) from a non-heterosexual perspective.
3. This early work, summarised in Slovic (1992), examines the relationship
between independent risk characteristic variables, such as familiarity, control,
catastrophic potential, voluntariness of exposure, inequity, and perceived
benefits, and dependent risk perception variables of a wide range of risks from
trampolines to radioactive waste.  This data was used to create so-called ‘risk
personality profiles’ (ibid p. 121).  This work suggests that greater perception
of risk is associated with risk characteristics, such as low familiarity, low
control, high catastrophic potential, low voluntariness of exposure, high
inequity, and low perceived benefits.
4.  Adeola (1994) conducted telephone interviews concerning hazardous waste
and petrochemical facilities with 213 residents of Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
Zimmerman (1993) analysed US national census data and hazardous waste
facility locations.  Both studies concluded that disadvantaged ‘racial’ groups
are more likely to live near sources of environmental risk than whites.  Such
findings have given rise to the notion of environmental racism (see various
works by Bullard in Adeola, 1994, p. 105).
5.  Davidson and Freudenburg (1996) also found the hypothesis that ‘health and
safety are more salient to women than to men’ (p. 323) to be compelling.
Hypotheses found to be less compelling by this study are that ‘men are likely
to be more knowledgeable about risk-related issues’ (p. 317), and that ‘men
are more likely than women to be concerned about economic issues [and that]
higher levels of concern about economic issues will be associated with lower43
levels of environmental concern’ (p. 322).  For descriptions of the debates
surrounding gender and perceptions of environmental risk see the above
mentioned paper and Slovic (1997), and for broader discussions of gender and
the environment see Jackson (1994).
6.  It will be noted that the statements in Box 4 represent both positive and
negative measures of the concepts discussed earlier.  Naturally, this has been
taken into account in all of the analyses undertaken.44
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